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Elite Transformation and Democratic
Transition in Macedonia and Slovenia
Židas Daskalovski
1 The process of democratization of the Eastern European countries has been recent focus
of attention of a number of political scientists1. Among the various authors writing on the
issue of democratic transition in post-communist Europe very few have concentrated on
the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in former Yugoslavia2. Out of the
few authors who did analyze the question of democratic transformation of the countries
that came into existence with the dissolution of the second Yugoslavia, few of them have
attempted to correlate this process with inter-republican discussions about the future
status of Yugoslavia.
2 The aim of this paper is to explain the distinct democratic transition of Slovenia and
Macedonia  using  Adam  Przeworski’s  theory  of  democratization,  and  to  show  the
importance of the elite’s responses to the questions and issues raised on federal level
concerning the status of second Yugoslavia to the fore-mentioned process3. This paper
will underline the importance of elite transformation on the democratization process in
Macedonia and Slovenia for two main reasons : first of all, only few studies have delt with
these two former Yugoslavian republics, and, secondly, these republics were the most
opposite of the former Yugoslavia.
 
Some Methodological Concepts
3 Przeworski divides the process of democratic transition into two phases. In the first stage,
labeled liberalization, authoritarian regimes brake down and democracy appears on the
political  agenda4.  In  the  second phase,  democratization,  the  new political  leadership
focuses on the formation of democratic institutions. A new constitution is a result of the
negotiations  between  the  representatives  of  the  opposition  and  the  ancien regime.
Stability and fairness of the constitution and the other new institutions depends on the
power positions of the negotiating parties,  and whether these relations are generally
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known. According to Przeworski, the case when the power relations are not known or are
unclear, is best ; then the political authors negotiate more balanced political institutions.
These  type  of  institutions  are  also  more  prone  to  last  longer  and  under  different
circumstances5. Finally, Przeworski, maintains that democracy, after the establishment of
democratic institutions, still faces challenges of an unbalanced ratio of political forces
within a society. For example, if the opposition stages general strike every time it loses
elections or the government adopts unfavorable policy, then the democratic institutions
might  be  weakened,  and  the  military  might  step  in6.  A  solution  to  this  problem,
Przeworski argues, is political pacts, agreements among « leaders of political parties to
divide government offices among themselves independent of election results, fix basic
policy orientations, and exclude and, if need, be repress outsiders »7.
4 Using Przeworski’s  theory this  paper will  show how both Macedonian and Slovenian
elites in the debates in post-Tito Yugoslavia promoted and defended their own national
interests vis-à-vis the interests of the other Yugoslav republics, and how at the peak of the
debates,  in the late  1980’s,  both agreed to liberalize the political  system in order to
broaden and legitimize their support in the federal negotiation processes. Confident that
they would win multi-party elections in their respective republics, both the Macedonian
and the Slovenian communist elites miscalculated the potential strength of the parties
and groups  which had  stronger  national  agendas  than their  own.  Consequently,  the
mixed, uninstructed results of the first democratic elections in Macedonia and Slovenia,
in opposition for example to those in Serbia and Croatia where one single party came to
dominate the presidency and the parliament, together with the international responses
to  the  Yugoslav  process  of  dissolution,  would  have  significant  impact  on  the
democratization processes  in both countries.  Soon after  the first  free elections,  both
Macedonian and Slovenian elites would choose a stable new institutional frameworks and
form political pacts with the emerging opposition parties, resulting in strengthening of
the democratization processes in both republics. However, as Higley and Burton argue,
stable  democracies  do  not  emerge  only  by  writing  constitutions,  and  founding  new
institutional frameworks ; the progress is also facilitated by what they term change in
status of political elites : from disunified to consensually unified elite types.
5 According  to  Higley  and  Burton  there  are  three  different  kinds  of  elite  types8,
consensually unified, ideologically unified, and disunified elites9.  Consensual elites are
characterized by inclusive structural integration and value consensus10. These types of
elites  might  take  opposing  policy  stances  in  public,  but  consistently  refrain  from
extending their disagreements to a point of violent conflict. Disunified elites, on the other
hand, are characterized by minimal structural integration and value consensus. Fractions
of disunified elites distrust each other, engage in ruthless, often violent conflicts, and do
not cooperate to hold back societal divisions or to avoid political crisis11. Ideologically
unified elites are typical for authoritarian countries, where structural integration and
value consensus are seemingly monolithic. Thus, ideologically unified elites appear to
have  complete  union,  publicly  support  the  same  policies,  and  are  members  of  a
centralized party or movement. 
6 Consequently,  Higley  and  Burton  maintain  that  the  “ideal”  kind  of  elites  is  the
consensually  unified type,  and that  the critical  step for  a  successful  democratization
includes  transformation  of  disunified  elites  into  consensually  unified  ones.  In  post
1989-1990  Eastern  Europe  there  were  two  main  ways  in  which  consensually  unified
national  elites  could  form :  through  a  direct  transformation,  or  through  an  elite
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settlement of basic disputes among elites. A direct transformation can occur if the party
elites acknowledge the counter productivity of communist ideology, embrace democracy,
and accommodate the emerging new elites12. This transformation is also possible through
an elite  settlement,  « a  relatively rare event in which warring national  elite  factions
suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their
most  basic  disagreements »13.  The  settlement  occurs  through  relatively  quick
negotiations among leaders of major elite factions. These negotiations are conducted by
experienced political  leaders and result  in formal written agreements14.  A number of
circumstances might foster this trend : an emergence of democratic ethos, a strong pro-
Western orientation, pragmatism, new orientations on the part of the former communists
elite in favor of economic liberalization and political democracy, and, conflict resolution
with cooperation among new and old elites, and thus solidarity sentiments15. Once this
elite unity and consensus is reached, stable democracies are feasible, but may also not16.
7 Macedonian and Slovenian elites achieved consensus and unity by combination of aspects
of both direct transformation to consensual unity and elite settlement. In the late 1980’s
both  Macedonian  and  Slovenian  elites  embraced  democracy,  thus  disregarding  old
communist  ideology.  They,  both,  however,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1990  elections,
negotiated elite settlements with the new elites. Nonetheless, the different Macedonian
and Slovenian elites’  policies and strategic responses before and during the Yugoslav
crisis, would have a great impact on the Macedonian and Slovenian paths to democratic
consolidation. While the Slovenian elites would be able to concentrate on the issues of
democratic restructuring and economic consolidation only, the Macedonian elites would
face additional problems of international recognition, economic sanctions, and minority
dilemmas.
 
Yugoslav Debates : 1980-1988
8 Kardelj’s  and  Tito’s  deaths  (in  1979  and  1980)  and  the  growing  economic  crisis  in
Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1980’s largely influenced the reemergence of the issues
of liberalization and nationalism, already raised on republican level and suppressed by
Tito in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s17. The question of liberalization, both in terms of
economic transformation and power legitimization, was intertwined with the issue of
republican interests, the status of the Yugoslav state, and thus, regional nationalism18.
During  1980’s  the  regional  Yugoslav  communist  leaders  tried  to  achieve  almost
impossible  goals :  to  restructure  the  federation  so  that  it  fits  different  republican
interests, to modernize the economy, and, lastly, to (re)legitimize their power authority.
9 As  a  result  of  the  events  in  the  late  1960’s  and  the  beginning  of  the  1970’s,  Tito
compromised with the dissident voices within the communist party and, in 1974, brought
a  constitution  which  de  facto  decentralized  the  country  and  the  communist  power
instrument,  the  League  of  Communist  of  Yugoslavia  (LCY)19.  Therefore,  the  1980’s
discussions within the LCY were not debates among federally unified communists but
between  regional  communist  party  leaders  seeking  to  defend  their  own  republican
interests. Although each regional party leadership was fractionated to some extent, in the
initial phase of the debate, in the beginning of the 1980’s all of the republican communist
elites opted for specific positions ;  thus,  while the Slovenian and Vojvodinian leaders
advocated liberalization and even greater Yugoslav decentralization, the Serbian leaders
strongly  favored  liberal  centralization,  while  the  Macedonian,  Croatian, and Kosovar
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parties preferred maintenance of the status quo, i.e., decentralized communist Yugoslavia
20.
10 In search for options how to deal with the crisis, in the beginning of the 1980’s Yugoslav
communists  began  the  process  of  (re)legitimatization  of  the  regime  which  would
eventually lead to the democratization of the country. Different options were proposed in
the discussions, ranging from proposals for restoration of the multi-party system, to a
“party-less”  socialist  system operated through citizens’  associations21.  Although some
propagated even stricter rule of the party, most of the ideas were undoubtedly quite
liberal and reform-oriented in character, ranging from calls for establishment of full-
fledged “social democracy” to multi-candidate communist elections22.
11 Parallel to the liberalization debate, was the discussion on the status of the federation and
the value of the 1974 Constitution. Paradoxically, inter-republican discussions over the
status of the Yugoslav federation would be the salient cause for the liberalization and the
break up of the country. Indeed, the Serbian upsurge of the institutionalized confederate
balance  of  power  game  would  inevitably  accelerate  the  centrifugal  processes  in
Yugoslavia. Serbian’s party leadership insistence on re-centralizing Yugoslavia would tip
of the status quo and provoke strong chain of reactions, first among the Slovenian, and
later among the other Yugoslav republics party leaders, which in turn would directly lead
former Yugoslav communists to embrace more radical options as solutions to the crisis :
democratization, and dissolution. Drastic changes in the attitude of the Serbian party
leadership toward the status of the Yugoslav federation would come about with the rise
to power of Slobodan Milošević, exactly in the midst of the federal level discussions on
how to overcome the Yugoslav crisis.
12 Until 1987, it seemed conceivable that while the regional elites would ask for further
debate on the future status of the federation, Yugoslavia could continue on a path of slow
transformation to pluralism and liberalization. However, the rise of S. Milošević who the
same  year  « succeeded  in  deposing  his  erstwhile  mentor,  Ivan  Stambolić,  and  in
establishing himself as the unrivaled boss in the republic of Serbia » would significantly
change  the  situation  in  the  country23.  Milošević  shrewdly  materialized  on  Serbian’s
people  national  sentiments  and  moved  to  change  Serbia’s  “disadvantaged  position”
within  the  Yugoslav  federation.  Using  the  ideology  of  the  nationalistic  wing  of  the
Serbian  intellectuals,  and  populist  methods,  in  the  period  between  1988  and  1989,
Milošević  swiftly  abolished  the  autonomous  status  of  the  Kosovo  and  Vojvodina
provinces, and installed his own supporters in the Montenegrin party leadership24.  By
taking  control  of  the  Serbian media  and establishing  “cult  of  personality”  Milošević
mobilized the Serbian society in favor of the slogan “strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia”25.
After entrenching his power in Serbia and Montenegro, Milošević aimed at changing the
federal constitution so that it meets Serbian interests better26. Not surprisingly, Serbia’s
new policies provoked a strong reaction among the other Yugoslav republican leaders ;
Slovenia among which taking a leading role in opposing Milošević. Already in 1988, and
especially  in  1989,  two clear  trends  among the Yugoslav republics  could be  gauged ;
promotion of particular, regional interests through mobilization of a growing pluralist
society,  and  consequently,  official  endorsement  of  democratization  and  multi-party
elections to further strengthen and legitimize the republican party leaderships.
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Rise of Slovenian Pluralism in the 1980’s and
Slovenian Elite Response to the Serbian Assertive
Role in the Federation
13 Tito’s  death signified change in  Yugoslav  communist  power  structures.  A  generation
which based its power on the partisan myth, the axiom “brotherhood and unity”, and the
communist party as the vanguard of the society, was slowly dying out and being replaced
by new, and younger party structures. While in Serbia this process lead to the rise of S.
Milošević, in other republics, and especially in Slovenia, the generation change provided
necessary fuel for the process of liberalization and “pluralization”. The combination of
ascendance to power of more liberal factions within the Slovenian communist party, and
the  growing  Yugoslav  crisis,  provided  a  greater  space  and  more  tolerance  for  the
development of different movements and ideas on the Slovenian scene. As a result, a
growing “pluralization” of the Slovenian society was taking place in the 1980’s.
14 The distinctive transformation to pluralism of the Slovenian society was initiated by the
punk movement. This culturally unique phenomenon which found grounds in Slovenia as
a sort of a youth subculture, was able to mobilize support in its defense against the more
conservative elements in the establishment, and initiate the pluralist way of life within
the Slovenian society27. The rise of the punk movement was followed by development of a
number of other alternative subcultures and social movements : pacifist, feminist, gay,
spiritual, etc.28 In the late 1980’s Radio Student became a medium that was increasingly
receptive to different  views on life  and culture29.  The transformed communist  youth
organization weekly Mladina and the new founded intellectual journal Nova Revija further
strengthened  the  dissemination  of  pluralistic  ideas  and  programs.  Furthermore,  the
Students’ Cultural and Artistic Center (SKUC) provided medium for many cultural and
artistic  productions,  including  those  of  Slovenian  alternative  rock  groups  such as
Borghesia, Pankrti, and Laibach. The foundation of a range of different theaters and the
growth  of  the  “graffiti”  culture  provided  an  additional  dimension  of  the  emerging
Slovenian pluralistic society. 
15 The gradual generation change and the rise to power of more liberal fraction within the
leadership of the Slovenian communist party in 1986 meant that the new elite would
continue to tolerate the blossoming of the Slovenian pluralistic views30. In fact, the party
elite became appreciative of some of the ideas the Slovenian civil society promoted. As
the tension over the future Yugoslav arrangements grew, the Slovenian party elite could
only look with approval upon the publication of a series of sixteen articles printed in the
special  February 1987 issue  of  Nova  Revija as  « contributions  to  the  Slovene national
program ». Since the program called for a radical improvement of the Slovenian position
within the Yugoslav federation, once discussed and supported by the public it could have
provided the Slovenian party leaders the needed legitimacy and support in the federal
debates about the status of the Yugoslav federation31. However, initially, the Slovenian
leadership did not utilize the Nova Revija “Slovenian National Program” to its advantage,
it would only be the Serbian mobilization of forces within the Serbian pluralistic scene,
including such variety of groupings as religious and academic institutions, that would
lead the Slovenian elites  to  follow suit  and try  to  effectively  mobilize  the Slovenian
pluralistic society in defense of its interests. This mobilization would necessarily lead the
Slovenian party elites to embrace a multi-party elections as an only way in order to
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legitimize their stance within the Yugoslav debates.  More importantly,  the Slovenian
elites would, by liberalizing, irreversibly turn the pendulum towards democratization of
the Slovenian society.
 
« Macedonian Way » of Pluralism and Macedonian
Party Elites Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis
16 Macedonian “pluralization” took its own form in the 1980’s. Devoid of Tito’s legacy of
suppressing narrow republican interests, Macedonia witnessed rise of plethora of groups,
movements, and associations that gradually emphasized elements of Macedonian ethnos
and culture that were largely ignored during the previous period32. Similarly to Slovenia,
first  signs  of  the  emergence  of  new  pluralist  tendencies  were  to  be  found  in  the
Macedonian cultural scene. The emergence of Padot na Vizantija, Macedonian “Byzantine
rock” group in the early 1980’s followed by the establishment of Aporea, a multimedia
“new art” project that underlined the Macedonian language and culture, signalized the
birth  of  a  new Macedonian culture33.  Mizar,  another  Macedonian “authentic  sounds”
group founded in 1981,and Padot na Vizantija were the two avant-garde music bands that
juxtaposed the vibes of Leb i Sol,the most popular Macedonian rock group, also highly
successful on the Yugoslav rock scene. The difference between the two seemed trivial, but
it is essential in understanding the rise of a new pluralistic culture in Macedonia ; while
the former sang in Macedonian and drew inspiration from the wealth of Macedonian
historical and folk traditions, combined with the legacy of the Byzantine culture, the
latter,  sang in Serbocroat and were famous as a great all-Yugoslav band34.  While the
communist party leadership largely ignored the manifestations of the former, still,  in
contrast to Tito’s time when it would have probably outlawed them, now, it did let them
perform.  During the  late  1980’s the  Youth Cultural  Center  (better  known as  “MKC”)
served as a medium where new “authentic” Macedonian cultural manifestations could
take part.
17 Meantime,  the  Macedonian  party  elites  did,  in  a  sharp  contrariety  to  the  general
communist  tradition  of  suppressing  religion,  tolerate  a  growing  assertion  of  the
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) in public life. During the 1980’s MOC was able to
commence building of a colossal Orthodox cathedral in the center of the Macedonian
capital,  Skopje.  Contrary  to  what  was  expected,  the  Macedonian  communist  leaders
endorsed the project, which was finished only in 1990, with much sympathy from the
Macedonian public35. Furthermore, in 1987, a group of young Macedonians established,
what was fundamentally, a soccer fans association, Komiti36. Although largely focused on
sport  events,  this  group  was  vibrant  in  provoking  historical  issues  and  questions
concerning the status of Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation. Energized by the
successes of the main Macedonian soccer club Vardar (it won the federal championship
for the first  and only time in the 1986-1987 season) Komiti ,  in their public gathering
before  and  after  the  soccer  matches,raised  to  the  surface  of  the  Macedonian  public
specific,  but during Tito’s time largely ignored,  if  not forbidden to discuss,  historical
issues37.
18 One  of  these  issues  was  the  treatment  of  Macedonian  minorities  in  the  countries
neighboring  the  Macedonian  part  of  the  Yugoslav  federation,  Greece,  Bulgaria,  and
Albania. Faced with rising nationalistic tensions in Kosovo, and subsequent discussions on
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federal level about minority rights, Macedonians felt that their own agenda within the
Yugoslav federation was being left out. Aegean Macedonians who left Greece during the
Greek  Civil  War  and  who  were  not  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes  by  the  Greek
government,  were  vocal  in  bringing  to  the  public  the  issue  of  misconduct  of  the
Macedonian  minorities.  Following  an  upsurge  of  activities  of  the  transnational
Macedonian human rights  network,  active in Greece,  USA,  Canada,  and Australia,  an
Aegean Macedonian association was also established in Macedonia proper38.
19 Founded  in  1986,  by  an  initiative  of  the  Aegean  Macedonians  living  in  Canada,  the
Association of Child Refugees from Aegean Macedonia had its headquarters in Skopje and
established branches in Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Canada, and Australia39. This
organization immediately dedicated its activities to the promotion of the status of the
Macedonian minority in Greece. In 1988, the association initiated the idea of holding a
gathering of all those Aegean Macedonians who were forced to leave Northern Greece in
the course of the Greek Civil War and were unable to return to their home land because of
the  discriminatory  policies  by  the  Greek  government.  Under  pressure  of  the  Greek
foreign ministry the Yugoslav federal authorities initially opposed the meeting and asked
the  Macedonian  party  either  to  postpone  it  or  to  cancel  it.  When  the  Macedonian
leadership answered that if the Yugoslav government insisted on canceling the meeting,
it would resign, the federal government, fearing public unrest in Macedonia,  stopped
pressing the matter further, and the reunion took place, in Skopje, between 30th June and
3rd July of 198840. The First International Reunion of Child Refugees of Aegean Macedonian
adopted a resolution urging the Greek government to allow Macedonian political refugees
who left Greece after the Greek Civil War to return to Greece. Furthermore, in late June
and early July 1988 a large demonstration of Macedonians who had left Greece as children
in 1948 took place in Skopje, capital of the Republic of Macedonia. This demonstration
was attended by several thousand Macedonians from all over the world and repeated on
August 10, 1988, on the 75th anniversary of the division and partition of Macedonia, when
a large protest by Macedonians was held in front of the UN building in New York.
20 The national agenda was soon picked up by the leading members of the Macedonian PEN
Association and reformulated in their writings and meetings.  Due to pressure by the
Macedonian association,  in  June,  1986 at  its  49th Congress,  the  international  writers’
organization, PEN, condemned the denial of the Macedonian language by Greece and sent
letters to the Greek PEN Centre and the Greek Minister for Culture. In addition, the dailies
Nova  Makedonija  and  Večer became  admissible  to  public  discussions  on  the  country’s
dilemmas and begun publishing articles on issues like minority and human rights and
pro’s  and  con’s  of  market  economy  and  democratic  reform.  The  Macedonian  youth
communist’s journal, Mlad Borec, together with the reformed newspaper of the League of
Communists of Macedonia, the weekly Magazine 21, also provided space for articulation of
pluralistic  views  on  the  nature  of  the  Macedonian  society  and  its  place  within  the
Yugoslav federation.  Moreover,  several  young,  well-endowed journalists  of  Mlad Borec
reevaluated and criticized the long rule of  the Macedonian nomenklatura and begun
covering  taboo  issues  like  the  question  whether  Macedonia  should  remain  in  the
Yugoslav federation, pursue confederate status, or become an independent state41.
21 The Macedonian political elites looked upon with sympathy to the gradual proliferation
of pluralistic views in Macedonia. They sought to instrumentalize the “pluralization” to
their needs, tolerating critique as long as it did not directly threatened party interests.
However, at the moment when the Yugoslav crisis deepened to an extent that the Serbian
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and the Slovenian leadership mobilized their societies and promoted two diametrically
antagonistic options to solve the Yugoslav crisis that were unacceptable to Macedonia,
the  Macedonian  elites  made  use  of  the  growing  Macedonian  pluralistic  society  to
legitimize and magnify the Macedonian public support for their position in the federal
level  debates.  Combining  advancement  of  a  relatively  reasonable  policy  towards  the
solution of the Yugoslav crisis, and image of the party as of one that cares for and affirms
the Macedonian national interests, the Macedonian party elite estimated that it would
inevitable carry victory in a multi-party elections42. However, they could not correctly
foretell the potential power of the even more national oriented forces within Macedonia. 
 
Serbia vs. Slovenia 1989-1990 ; Slovenia Liberalizes
22 Meantime, as Yugoslavia witnessed debates on federal level about the solutions to the
growing crisis, both Macedonian and Slovenian societies were experiencing a period of
“pluralization.” The open question was how would the Macedonian and Slovenian elites
react to this phenomenon in light of the strong Serbian nationalist tendencies. Faced with
growing Serbian nationalism mounting during whole of 1988, Slovenian elites responded
equally energetically opposing Serbian demands for centralization of  Yugoslavia with
counterproposals for special Slovenian status within the federation and by mobilizing the
increasingly pluralistic Slovenian society43. Throughout 1988 Slovenian elites increasingly
talked about the “asymmetric federation model” in which Slovenia would have enjoyed
special prerogatives against the other Yugoslav republics44. For example, in contrast with
the wide spread practice that soldiers of the federal army served in a different republic
than the one they were from, the Slovenes asked for special Slovenian military district
where  all  Slovenian  conscripts  would  serve.  In  opposition  to  the  common  use  of
Serbocroat  in  the  Yugoslav  military  units,  in  the  new  proposed  district  the  solely
language of command should have become Slovenian. In short,  Slovenia envisioned a
system of uneven constitutional  arrangement of  the Yugoslav federal  units,  a system
which would have made Slovenia’s relations to the rest of the federation confederate45.
23 The mobilization of the Slovenian public can be traced to the trial of the four journalist of
Mladina, Janez Janša, Ivan Borstner, David Tašič, and Franci Zavrl for publishing secret
army files, in June 1988. Conducted in Serbocroat the proceedings deeply irritated the
Slovenes.  The  Slovenian  leadership  implicitly  supported  public  protest  rallies  and
encouraged,  if  not  initiated,  the  foundation  of  the  “Independent  Committee  for  the
Protection of Human Rights”46. This committee issued periodical bulletins in English and
protest petitions. Support for the four indicted was quickly generated by the Slovenian
Peasants  Union,  the  local  trade  union,  and  the  Slovene  Bishops’  Conference  of  the
Catholic  Church.  Moreover,  the  Slovenian  party  elites  tacitly  approved  a  large
mobilization of  the  Slovenian public  that  took a  form of  a  protest  rally  against  the
military trial.  On June 22nd,  40 000 people,  an enormous figure for small  country like
Slovenia, demonstrated on Ljubljana’s Liberation Square against the unjust military court
proceedings. Allowing unification of different factions in the republic under a common
national cause, the Slovenian communist leaders improved their rating in the eyes of the
Slovenian public, which, increasingly felt that it had common interests with the party
elite47. Encouraging mobilization, Slovenian elites broadened the social base of the regime
and strengthened their power position. At that moment, the Slovenian leadership could
not only tolerate the mobilization of  the Slovenian pluralistic  society,  but could also
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initiate  further  liberalization48.  Confident  that  they  would  still  gather  most  of  the
electoral support, and following a reform strategy, the Slovene party elites at the end of
1989 decided to allow multi-party elections for the republican assembly49. As a result, the
Slovenian  transition  would  « most  closely  parallel  the  Hungarian  method of  gradual
evolutionary change and internal party reform »50. More importantly, this transition has
« occurred by way of national mobilization and it would be impossible to imagine that it
could have been successful otherwise »51.  On its way to became a democratic political
elite,  the  Slovenian party  leaders  « emerged as  defenders  of  national  interests »  and
« found their  legitimization basis  in nationalism »52.  The Slovenian party elite,  in the
period between 1988 and 1989, in the midst of legitimization crisis and under Serbian
threat,  opted  for  liberalization  as  the  only  choice  out  of  the  crisis.  However,  it  is
important to note, that the liberal wing of the Slovenian communist party that came into
power in the 1980’s proceeded with reforms of the system only after it had successfully
mobilized  the  Slovenian pluralistic  society  in  favor  of  the  particular  solution to  the
Yugoslav crisis advocated by the party. This fact has convinced the Slovenian elite that
they could win competitive elections, if they moved to a democratic system of governing53
.
24 Following the “military affair” in September 1989, the Slovenian leadership strengthened
its bargaining position in the Yugoslav debates by passing amendments to the Slovenian
constitution unilaterally granting the Slovenian republic the right to secession and the
right  to  approve  or  disapprove  proclamation by  federal  authorities  of  extraordinary
measures  in  their  republic.  Thus,  while  Serbian national  leaders  broke  the  Yugoslav
status quo by centralizing Serbia’s position against its autonomous provinces Kosovo and
Vojvodina, and asking for a similar centralization on a federal level, Slovenia responded
with assertion of its own rights in relation to the federation. Although motivated and
executed in different fashions, both these streams carried dangerous implications for the
Yugoslav unity as a whole.
25 Serbian response to the new Slovene amendments worsened the situation even further.
The pro-Milošević Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo declared their intention to hold
a protest rally in Ljubljana on December 1st, where they thought to bring 30-40 000 of
their  fellow  co-nationals  from Serbia  and  Kosovo  to  inform the  Slovenes  about  the
situation in the province of Kosovo. In reaction, the Slovenian party elite banned the
meeting and exposed their view that the protest rally would be considered as “an act of
civil war”54. As counter measure, Serbian leadership asked Serbian enterprises to severe
business contracts with Slovenia. A month later, in January 1990, the 14th (Extraordinary)
Congress of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia only confirmed the already existent
split among the regional party organizations. The congress witnessed conflicts among the
Serbian and Slovenian delegates  on the reform issues  and ended with the Slovenian
delegation walking out of the meeting. Twelve days later the Slovenian party withdraw
from the league, renamed itself into a Party of Democratic Renewal, and turned its back
to all-Yugoslav politics. With the falling apart of the LCY, Yugoslavia de facto ceased to
exist in the form that Tito has conceived it55. The open question was whether it could
remain a piece in any form whatsoever ?
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Macedonian Chooses a Middle Way and Liberalizes 
26 Slovenian liberalization was largely influenced by a reaction to the growing Yugoslav
crisis that included close interaction between Slovenian party elites and civil  society.
Albeit instated by different motives, this interaction also took place in Macedonia. It is
important to note that in the immediate post-Tito period the Macedonian party elites
followed a conservative course of action, thus favoring the preservation of status quo of
Yugoslav politics, i.e., decentralized and communist Yugoslavia. However, in the second
half of the 80’s, the combination of the effects of the Macedonian media liberalization and
the “pluralization” of the Macedonian society deepened the chasm between the liberal
and  the  conservative  camps  in  the  communist  leadership56.  Since  the  more  liberal
fraction of the Macedonian communists prevailed in the conflict and took over the party,
it begun changing the course of Macedonian politics57. Represented by a new generation
of  young  leaders  like  Vasil  Tupurkovski,  Petar  Gočev,  Ġorġi  Spasov,  and  Branko
Crvenkovski,  the  Macedonian  party  leadership  now  reoriented  its  policies  towards
reforms  of  the  system,  though  still  favoring  the  1974  Yugoslav  constitutional
arrangements which left wide powers to the regional centers.
27 Contrary to the Macedonian party policy immediately after Tito’s  death,  Macedonian
party elites in the second half of the 1980’s advanced pro-reform ideas. Thus, for example,
in 1985, the Macedonian representative to the Socialist Alliance of Workers People of
Yugoslavia  (SAWPY) Aleksandar  Grličkov,  argued against  the public  monopoly of  the
ruling party and assessed that a non-communist could not stand a chance to become
member of the republican leadership of the SAWPY. He proposed greater, up to 50 %,
participation of “non-communists” in the SAWPY58.  By the end of 1980’s Macedonian
communist leaders were well aware of the structural crisis of the party and advocated
reforms.  In  March of  1988,  Petar  Gočev,  a  member of  the  Presidency of  the  Central
Committee, stressed the need for reforms within the economical and political system of
the country59. In October of the same year Vasil Turpurkovski, Macedonian member of
the  collective  Yugoslav  presidency,  explained  the  need  for  democratization  of  the
communist  party.  Speaking  about  the  crisis  in  Yugoslavia,  in  November,  1988,
Tupurkovski, exposed the idea of reforms and a change to “democratic centralism, i.e.,
inner party democracy”60.
28 The rise of  Serbian nationalism alarmed Macedonian party elites  about the potential
danger of a significant decrease of the status of Macedonia within Yugoslavia61. Serbian
nationalist leaders alienated Macedonians by trying to pass a federal law that could have
allowed Serbian colonist who had acquired land in Macedonia and Kosovo during first
Yugoslavia to reclaim their land. Furthermore, in October 1989, the Serbian leadership
« intensively backed a proposal to declare 1st December - the day on which Yugoslavia
was first united in 1918 - a national holiday »62.  Since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had
mistreated the rights of Macedonians, even degrading them to the rank of “south Serbs”,
Macedonian party elites became anxious about the possible outcomes of the Yugoslav
crisis.  In  response,  they mobilized the  Macedonian pluralists  society  to  promote  the
“Macedonian case” within the federation. 
29 Thus,  in  line  with  robust  nationalist  tendencies  in  the  other  Yugoslav  republics,
Macedonian elite presented to the Macedonian public a similar strategy.  Macedonian
party leaders took advantage of the increasing human rights activity of the Macedonian
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diaspora,  which in the late  1980’s  begun promoting the interests  of  the Macedonian
minorities in neighboring countries, Greece in particular, to advance Macedonian agenda
within the Yugoslav framework.  Encouraged by the success of  the First  International
Reunion of Child Refugees of Aegean Macedonian, throughout the second half of 1988, the
Macedonian  party  leadership  increasingly  begun  speaking  about  the  status  of  the
Macedonian  minorities  in  neighboring  countries63.  Pressured  by  the  Macedonian
republican government, the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations, in November
1989, accused Greece to oppress the human rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece64
.  Macedonian public  responded quickly  and with  even stronger  national  sentiments.
Throughout  1989  at  soccer  matches  of  Vardar  Skopje  radicalized  Macedonian  youths
chanted  nationalist  slogans  like  « Solun  [Salonika]  is  ours »,  « Prohor  Pćinjski  [a
monastery near the border with Serbia which since 1953 has been part of the northern
republic]  is  Macedonian »,  and  « united  Macedonia »65.  Graffiti  with  similar  content
appeared on the walls of Skopje, but the authorities refrained from hostile actions66. In
May 1989 an international delegation of Aegean Macedonians presented the problem of
the Macedonian national minority in Greece to the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva
and met with representatives of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The Macedonian
party elite sympathized with the human rights efforts of the Aegean Macedonians. Thus,
Vasil  Tupurkovski,  in  a  speech  delivered  to  the  Yugoslav  Federal  Assembly,  in  late
October,  criticized  the  manifestations  of  extreme  Macedonian  nationalism,  but,  still,
emphasized  the  need  for  more  coherent  Yugoslav  policy on  the  question  of  the
discrimination of the Macedonian minority rights in Greece, and Bulgaria67.
30 In 1989, Macedonian leadership changed the republican constitution so that Macedonia
was redefined as the state of the “Macedonian people” in place of the previous “a state of
the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities”.  Macedonian party
ideologist Svetomir Shkarik explained the changes :  « Macedonia is to be defined as a
state, and the only bearer of this statehood should be the Macedonian nation. That is why
the  new  definition  excludes  the  sovereignty  of  the  nationalities  in  Macedonia »68.
Similarly to the other republican leaders’ reactions to the tense Yugoslav situation the
Macedonian party elites too strengthened the legal position of the titular nationality in
Macedonia,  the  ethnic  Macedonians69.  Hence,  by  changing  the  constitutional
amendments,  and  thus  preserving  Macedonian  interests  against  any  potential
manipulations by the Macedonian minorities, the party showed that it cared about the
interests of the Macedonian people.
31 Having defeated the more conservative forces within the party and given the fact that in
the  late  1980’s  the  Macedonian  communists strongly  sustained  Macedonian  national
interests, the liberal faction in power felt confident that the introduction of multi-party
elections would not significantly change their authority position within the Macedonian
society.  Consequently,  already  in  early  1989,  Vasil  Tupurkovski  begun  advocating
pluralism as  the  solution to  the  degenerating  situation in  the  Yugoslav  federation70.
Throughout 1989 Tupurkovski repeatedly noted that de-monopolization of the party and
“pluralization” of the society should be the top priority on the agenda71. By mid-1989, the
Macedonian communists were deeply committed to the introduction of a multi-party
system in Macedonia72. In December of 1989, just before the 14th Congress of the Yugoslav
communist party, Gočev, acting as the new elected president of the Macedonian Central
Committee, declared that Macedonia supported reforms73. Moreover, in February, 1990,
immediately  after  the  break  up  of  the  League  of  Communist  of  Yugoslavia,  Gočev
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announced that the Macedonian communist party would transform into a modern social
democratic party and contest in the republican multi-party elections scheduled for the
fall of that year74.
 
Slovenia Democratizes ; Prefers Independence
1990-1992
32 As we have seen, the process of liberalization in Slovenia and Macedonia was peaceful and
gradual. In both republics the party elites played a salient role in transforming the “one
party”  rule  with  multi-party  elections.  Also,  both  party  elites  expected  to  win  the
democratic contest and remain in power. As a matter of fact, on the eve of the spring
elections in 1990, Slovenian reformed communist seemed designated to win ; they had a
powerful organizational structure, reform oriented program, a strong national agenda in
the negotiations with the other Yugoslav republics, and a quite popular leader. However,
some  of  the  already  mobilized  different  fractions  of  the  pluralist  society  that  now
structured as parties, presented to the Slovenian public even more radical program in
favor of reforms and the Slovenian national agenda. Thus, DEMOS, an “umbrella” type of
coalition, comprised of six different non-communist parties, with its radicalized version
of the Slovenian communist nationalism, managed to “hijack” much of the central stage
of  Slovenian politics.  DEMOS made it  clear  that  Slovenia’s  priorities  laid  outside  the
existing concept  of  Yugoslavia.  As  a  top DEMOS official  explained :  « Yugoslavia  as  a
concept is exhausted. Slovenia simply wants to join Europe and is not willing to wait for
the rest  of  Yugoslavia to catch up with it »75.  The president of  DEMOS advocated an
independent Slovenia, although not “secession at any cost”76. Moreover, DEMOS appeared
to be more nationalistic then the reformed communists in the sphere of minority rights
asking for abolition of special laws protecting the republic’s ethnic minorities.
33 Not  surprisingly,  the  1990  Slovenian  multi-party  elections  produced  uninstructive
results : while the parliament and, hence, the government, became dominated by DEMOS,
the  presidency  was  won  by  the  reformed  communist  candidate  Milan  Kučan.  The
uninstructive results of the Slovenian elections inaugurated a new leadership which took
even tougher stand on the possibility of keeping Yugoslavia together. Thus, in the period
between  April  1990  and  June  1991,  the  new  Slovenian  leadership  prepared  for
independence - on diplomatic, legislative, and military level - rather than focusing its
energy to try to preserve Yugoslavia. Although, the Slovenian government continued to
offer different solutions for the Yugoslav crisis, like advocating a model of very loose
confederacy, given the Serbian factor, it still did it halfheartedly - hoping for the best, but
preparing  for  the  worst.  In  July  1990,  the  new  Slovenian  parliament  adopted  three
amendments to the Slovenian constitution which invalidated all federal Yugoslav laws
and acts of federal organs that were contrary to the constitution and laws of republic of
Slovenia77. A joint Croatian-Slovenian proposal for further decentralization of Yugoslavia
followed in October. After the Serbian side responded with the idea favoring a model of
“modern federation” which upheld the notion of “one man one vote”, in December 1990,
Slovenia further pressed the question of its own prerogatives first, and the federation
later78.
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34 In December, 1990, in a national referendum more than 88 % of Slovenians voted in favor
of  a  future  independence.  In  fact,  by  dawn of  1991  Slovenia  already  behaved  as  an
independent state : 
it began withholding the federal customs duties and other payments from Belgrade,
set up independent institutions for the conduct of its foreign policy (including a
number  of  quasi-diplomatic  offices  abroad),  and  began  preparations  for  the
establishment of a Slovenian army and the introduction of a separate currency79.
35 On 26th  of  December the Slovenian legislature adopted a declaration of  its  republic’s
sovereignty80. In February 1991 the Slovenian parliament adopted a resolution calling for
a consensual disassociation of Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. Moreover, fearing
that  the  Yugoslav  crisis  might  get  out  of  control  despite  the  series  of  summit  talks
between all the Yugoslav republican presidents aimed at finding a formula for a future
Yugoslav union, the Slovenian leadership, in May 1991, proposed a deadline of 26th of
June for the other republics to agree to a confederation81.  When, eventually, the new
republican  leaders  could  not  find  a  compromise,  on  25th of  June,  Slovenia  declared
independence, disassociating from Yugoslavia. Following a brief military conflict against
the increasingly pro-Serbian federal army, Slovenia managed to arrange the withdrawal
of the Yugoslav army troops, and, therefore, accomplish a de facto independence from the
other Yugoslav republics82.
36 With the question of Slovenian participation in a future Yugoslav state put aside, the new
Slovene elites could concentrate on more pressing matters, reforms of Slovenian system.
As  a  result  of  the  unclear  results  of  the  elections,  there  were  long  and  extensive
deliberations concerning the nature of the new Slovenian constitution among the
different parties represented in the parliament. Finally, the new Slovenian constitution
was adopted on 23rd of December 1991. The constitution brought a compromise between
two  fundamentally  different  views  on  how  a  democratic  policy  should  arrange  and
regulate itself ; one advocated by the parties right of the center, advocating significant
role of the Catholic Church in state affairs including such issues as abortion and religious
education, and the other championed by the reformed communist, in favor of gradual
transformation of the Slovene society and building a social democracy83.
37 The  uninstructed  results  of  the  Slovenian  elections  resulted  in  the  new  Slovenian
constitution being stable and balanced introducing checks and balances and maximizing
the  influence  of  minorities84.  The  new  constitution  transformed  Slovenia  into  a
parliamentary democracy and « incorporated the existing standards in the field of human
rights »85.  In order to insure the protection of human rights the Slovenian legislature
introduced the institution of  a Human Rights Ombudsman86.  After significant debates
between proponents of unicameral and proponents of bicameral assembly it was decided
that the parliament would be unicameral. However, the work of the national assembly
which had legislative powers,  was to be checked and balanced by the newly formed
Council of State. The council, as an advisory body, had an authority to review, and if
deemed necessary, return pieces of legislation to the national assembly. Furthermore, the
new Slovenian elites, introduced rules ensuring an independent judiciary and media.
38 Finally, the Slovenian new elites, embracing both the DEMOS coalition and the reformed
communist presidency, agreed on their basic policy orientations : European integration
and economic transformation and privatization. Although having different approaches to
the pressing issues, the Slovenian elites established consensus, a pact, concerning the
fundamental values of the Slovenian democratization process : both, the opposition and
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the coalition in power favored independent, democratic and pro- market economy and
European Union membership for Slovenia. Although in Spring of 1992 the ruling coalition
split, and the government fell, the early established consensus was not broken. The new
Slovenian coalition government formed in early 1993, still continued to steer Slovenia on
the already paved path of democratization. In fact, the EC recognition of Slovenia as an
independent state, on 15th of January 1992, marked the end of the first phase of Slovenian
democratization : the new government would carry on issues of democratic consolidation
only. 
 
Macedonia Opts for Preservation of Yugoslavia ;
Democratizes
39 Liberalization of Macedonian society and the introduction of multi-party system brought
to the public scene different opposition views. Among the first to organize into a political
association was a fraction of the Macedonian intellectuals concerned with the well being
of the Macedonian nation and the state. On 4th of February 1990, the more nationally
oriented  Macedonian  intelligentsia  founded  the  MAAK  party  (Movement  for  Pan-
Macedonian  Action).  The  core  of  the  party  was  recruited  from  the  sections  of  the
Macedonian  Writers  Union  that  in  the  late  1980’s  voiced  strong  pro-Macedonian
sentiments. Not surprisingly, therefore, MAAK criticized Bulgaria and Greece on their
human rights records, while in the same time favoring more Macedonian course of action
on the Yugoslav scene. 
40 Meantime the Macedonian communist leaders continued with the policy of mobilization
of the Macedonian society affirming Macedonia and its interests within the Yugoslav
federation. On 20th of February the Macedonian party elites organized a mass rally in the
center of  Skopje87.  These demonstrations,  attended by some 75 000 people,  promoted
Macedonian identity  and protested  against  the  oppression of  ethnic  Macedonians  in
Greece, and Bulgaria88. The protest was tacitly prepared to coincide with the visit of the
Greek  Prime  Minister  to  the  Yugoslav  federal  government  in  Belgrade89.  Another
mobilization of the Macedonian public occurred in May the same year, when « 50 000
Macedonians blocked the border crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in an effort to
convince the Greek government to recognize its Macedonian minority and to persuade
the Yugoslav government to pressure the Greek government to move in this direction as
well »90.  Macedonian  communists  also  reacted  upon  Serbian  nationalist  designs  on
Macedonia.  Thus,  in  a  speech  held  on  2nd of  June,  Petar  Gočev,  not  only  castigated
Bulgaria, and Greece, but also warned about the potential danger coming from the north91
.
41 The  same  month  the  Macedonian  leadership,  “internationalized”  its  care  for  the
Macedonian national interests. At the second meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension, held in Copenhagen in June of 1990,  the Macedonian influenced Yugoslav
delegation again raised the issue of minority rights in Greece and Bulgaria. In corporation
with Macedonian minority activists  from different countries,  the Yugoslav delegation
introduced  a  “Memorandum  Relating  to  the  Macedonian  National  Minority”  which
accused the governments of Bulgaria and Greece of a number of specific violations of the
human rights  of  the  members  of  the  Macedonian national  minorities  living in  their
countries92.  Mobilizing the Macedonian society and appearing on the forefront of the
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defense of Macedonian national interests, Macedonian reformed communist party looked
with much hope upon the upcoming multi-party elections.
42 In late June 1990, another nationalist party emerged on the Macedonian scene. Supported
by the Macedonian emigration and founded by such eminent Macedonian dissidents as
Dragan Bogdanovski  and Goran Jakovlevski,  the new party was named VMRO-DPMNE
(Internal  Macedonian Revolutionary Organization -  Democratic  Macedonian Party  for
Macedonian Unity)93. The party platform previously published in the March issue of Mlad
Borec largely related to the ideals of the historical VMRO, nationalist organization that
had aimed to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman rule94. Led by the charismatic, young
leader, Ljubčo Georgirevski, VMRO-DPMNE, pledging to work for the ideal of “all free
Macedonians united”, overshadowed the national agendas of both MAAK, and the reform
communists. The party also asked for immediate improvement of Macedonian relations
with Slovenia and Croatia, and for the return of the “Macedonian territories” within the
Serbian boundaries95.
43 On the eve of the first multiparty elections in Macedonia, held in November 1990, over
twenty  parties  were  operating  in  the  country.  The  reformed communists  (League  of
Communists of Macedonia - Party of Democratic Transition, SKM-PDP) run on a platform
that  sought  recognition  for  Macedonian  sovereignty  in  some  type  of  “Yugoslav
framework”96.  Similar  platform  was  exposed  by  the  Macedonian  Alliance  of  Reform
Forces, an economically oriented party that had connection to the only party that was
based  throughout  Yugoslavia,  and  was  founded  by  the  then  federal  premier  Ante
Marković.  SKM-PDP  opted  for  a  Macedonian  identity  and  dignity  and  promised  to
organize Macedonia as a 
sovereign  state  which  accepts  union  with  other  peoples  of  Yugoslavia  only  on
voluntary and equal basis, and of course with the right of secession… Yugoslavia is
possible only as a union of sovereign states with those delegated and agreed powers
at  the  union level  that  each of  the  several  members  of  the  union is  willing  to
delegate without pressure97. 
44 Although SKM-PDP, promoted Macedonian interests, it was still careful enough to leave
an open door for the possibility of a transformed Yugoslav state.
45 The  SKM-PDP  opponents  were  those  parties  which  had  intrinsically  even  more
Macedonian agenda on their program, MAAK, and VMRO-DPMNE. The moderate but still
nationally minded MAAK advocated “a spiritual union of all Macedonians” in a sovereign
Macedonian state that would be part of confederate Yugoslavia but no longer subject to
Serbian “hegemonism”98. VMRO-DPMNE, too, was committed to Macedonian sovereignty,
but not necessarily within a Yugoslav confederation only : the party envisioned a broader
confederate union of Yugoslavia,  Bulgaria,  and Greece, which would de facto bring all
Macedonians in the region under the auspices of a single state. As an only alternative to
this project VMRO-DPMNE discussed a complete separation from Yugoslavia99. Supported
by Macedonians from the diaspora, and largely playing with nationalist rhetoric, VMRO-
DPMNE send appealing messages to large segments of Macedonian society. The party’s
stand against the largely perceived as illegal Kosovar Albanian immigration into Western
Macedonia, in favor of return of property of dispossessed Macedonians in Greece, and the
« spiritual,  economic,  and  ethnic  union  of  the  divided  Macedonian  people  and  the
creation  of  a  Macedonian  state  in  a  future  united  Balkans  and  united  Europe »,
significantly increased VMRO-DPMNE’s popularity among the Macedonian voters100.
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46 Not  surprisingly  the  results  of  the  parliamentary  elections  showed  how  much  the
Macedonian communist elite had underestimated the potential strength of parties that
put even more emphasis on the Macedonian matters than SKM-PDP101. Although in the
late 1980’s Macedonian communists led the republic on a relatively reasonable course,
and,  in  1990,  offered  the  Macedonian  public  very  sensible  solutions  to  the  frantic
Yugoslav situation combining it with a strong pro-Macedonian preelection agenda, SKM-
PDP still could not win the 1990 parliamentary elections. Riding on a nationalist ticket
VMRO-DPMNE was the most successful  party obtaining 38 seats (31,7 percent)  in the
legislature, followed by the reformed communist with 31 seats (25,8 percent), a coalition
representing  the  interests  of  the  Macedonian  Albanian  minority  with  23  seats  (18,3
percent) and the economically oriented Alliance of Reform Forces with 17 seats (14,2
percent).
47 The outcome of the election produced rather highly fragmented and unclear results102.
The new Macedonian leadership,  that came about with successful  negotiations of the
parties gaining most at the elections, had a more or less similar approach to the Yugoslav
crisis as the pre-election stance of the Macedonian communist. The new Macedonian elite
still insisted on some sort of consensus on the status of Yugoslavia, while maintaining its
independent  course  of  action.  On  January  25th,  1991,  the  parliament  adopted  a
Declaration  of  Sovereignty  which  stated  that  the  independence  and  the  territorial
integrity of the Macedonian people,  based upon their right to self-determination and
secession, should be guaranteed in a forthcoming constitution and validated through a
popular referendum. The declaration also anticipated an equal role for Macedonia in the
inter-republican negotiations on Yugoslavia’s future.
48 Shortly after  the adaptation of  the Declaration of  Sovereignty,  on January 27th,  1991
Macedonian assembly elected Kiro Gligorov president of the country. Immediately upon
his inauguration Gligorov won the support of the parliament and dedicated his efforts to
a three point plan : preservation of Yugoslavia through a peaceful resolution of the crisis,
creation of a parliamentary democracy secured by adoption of a new constitution, and
promotion of the rights of national minorities in Macedonia103. Aware of the perils for
Macedonia  if  Yugoslavia  disintegrated,  Gligorov,  together  with  Alija  Izetbegović,  the
president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, concentrated in mediating between the two sides
holding opposed views on the future status of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Serbia. On June 3rd
Gligorov, together with Izetbegović, proposed a new Yugoslav framework which would
have included a common army,  currency,  and foreign policy104.  However,  throughout
1991, despite the Gligorov and Izetbegović’s mediating efforts, the political rift between
the  two  opposing  sides  of  the  Yugoslav  conflict  only  widened.  Yugoslav  Army’s
intervention  in  Slovenia  in  June,  1991,  and  the  multiplication  of  armed  skirmishes
between Serbian irregulars and police authorities in Croatia only worsened the already
tense situation.
49 Faced with an increasingly violent deterioration of the crisis in Yugoslavia, which could
have had dangerous implications on Macedonian security, in the spring of 1991 Gligorov
insisted on,  and succeeded in,  forming a  government  representing all  parliamentary
parties as  a kind of  a “national  front” for achieving Macedonia’s  strategic aims.  The
“government  of  experts”  represented  the  broad  consensus  among  the  Macedonian
parties concerning the fundamental Macedonian policy orientations and in support for
democratic and sovereign, or in case of a break up of Yugoslavia, independent Macedonia,
the rule of law, market economy, and joining the European system. The constellation of
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powers in the new government and the presidency came about as a result of a party pact
between the leading Macedonian parties105.
50 Following the violent summer of 1991, when fighting erupted first in Slovenia, and then
throughout Croatia, Gligorov and the new Macedonian government, decided to go ahead
with the plans for obtaining independence. On September 8th, 1991, a referendum was
held in which more than 95 % of those voting voted for a sovereign and independent
state. On September 17th , the same year Macedonian parliament, the Sobranie, adopted a
Declaration on the proclamation of  the results  of  the referendum. The uninstructive
results of  the 1990 parliamentary elections brought the major Macedonian parties to
adopt  more  balanced  and  stable  constitution106.  The  new  Macedonian  constitution
promulgated on 1st of November, 1991, and brought as a result of complicated debates
between  the  major  Macedonian  parties,  established  Macedonia  as  a  parliamentary
democracy and provided space for  “cohabitation” between the Macedonians  and the
minority groups within the country107. Modeled on constitutions of well established
democracies, the Macedonian supreme legal document introduced a system of checks and
balances,  dividing  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judiciary  powers108.  Furthermore,
according to the constitution, the principle of human rights and freedoms, was the « basis
on which the social organization of the Macedonian society must be built »109. In order to
serve  the  interests  of  the  ethnic  minorities,  the  constitution  provided  for  the
establishment of a Council for Interethnic Relations within the legislature110.  The new
constitution  also  avoided  the  vacuum  in  the  sphere  of  legal  continuity  through
successfully resolving the issues of the relationships of the new legal order vis-à-vis both
the previous federal legal framework and the international laws and conventions.
51 Macedonia  completed  the  democratization process  on  November,  21st,  1991,  when it
declared independence from rump Yugoslavia. However, unlike Slovenia, which by April
1992 was recognized by the European Community, Macedonia was kept out of the loop,
hostage of Greek policy111. Because of Greek objections, and despite the EC’s Badinter
Commission recommendation that argued that among the Yugoslav republics aspiring to
become independent only Slovenia and Macedonia met the minimum requirements for
recognition as democratic states, Macedonia was not recognized by the EC in 1992. Thus,
the process of democratic transition have left the Macedonian elite with a bitter taste in
mouth ;  although  Macedonia  successfully  liberalized  and  introduced  parliamentary
democracy, Yugoslavia did not restructure to meet Macedonian interests, and breaking
apart, brought to the new Macedonian leadership unique predicaments to be handled in
the period of democratic consolidation : problems of international recognition adherence
to  the  UN  economic  sanctions  against  Yugoslavia,  Greek  diplomatic  and  economic
pressure  resulting  in  the  imposition  of  a  unilateral  embargo  in  1994-1995,  etc.
Consequently, the accumulation of these problems would have a significant impact on the
way party politics and minority issues were handled in the period (1992-1996), but, this is
not the topic of this paper.
 
Conclusions
52 Macedonian  and  Slovenian  elites  followed  a  distinct  path  to  liberalization  and
democratization.  The  road  to  democracy  was  paved  when  in  the  late  1980’s  both
Macedonian and Slovenian elites embraced multi-party elections, and disregarded the old
communist  ideology.  As  Przeworski  mentioned,  liberalization  can  occur  if  the
Elite Transformation and Democratic Transition in Macedonia and Slovenia
Balkanologie, Vol. III, n° 1 | 2007
17
“liberalizers” in the communist party feel secure that they will win competitive elections
if « they proceed all the way to democracy »112. Thus, the decision to liberalize is rather
psychological,  but  as  the  cases  of  Slovenia  and  Macedonia  show,  plausible.  In  both
countries,  the  elites  have  sought  to  mobilize  their  societies  to  promote  republican
interests  in  discussions  over  the  future  status  of  the  Yugoslav  federation.  Doing  so
Macedonian and Slovenian elites have generated enough public sympathy and support to
feel secure about the possibility of “opening up” and reforming the system.
53 Despite  initially  strong  positions  and  national  oriented  platforms,  Slovenian  and
Macedonian party  elites  did  not  win parliamentary  elections  in  1990  because  of  the
emergence of parties and coalitions that had even more national programs. Still,  the
democratic elections in Slovenia and Macedonia produced uninstructive outcomes. As
hypothesised by Przeworski, this type of elections’ results positively affects the formation
of  new democratic  institutions.  The new adopted constitutions  in  both Slovenia  and
Macedonia were balanced and stable. Furthermore, in both Macedonia and Slovenia the
parties negotiated a pact, or a consensus on the basic policy orientations of the countries,
and, in the case of Macedonia, also on the distribution of offices within the government.
By  gradually  transforming  the  monolith  communist  system  and  negotiating  elite
settlements,  the  Macedonian  and  Slovenian  elites  achieved  consensus  and  unity
necessary for the process of democratic transformation113. All these factors signify that
Macedonia and Slovenia had a distinct  but  successful  transition from communism to
democracy.
54 During the process, Yugoslavia disintegrated as a state and both Slovenia and Macedonia
declared independence. While the Slovenian elites were prepared for such an outcome of
the Yugoslav crisis, the Macedonian leadership was taken by surprise. If the Slovenian
elite, in the debates for the solution of the Yugoslav crisis, opposed Serbia and stressed
that if their interests were not taken into account Slovenia would secede, Macedonian
leadership tried to mediate the conflict, and find compromise settlement. These different
policies towards the Yugoslav crisis had an impact on the democratization processes in
Macedonia  and  Slovenia.  After  Yugoslavia  violently  disintegrated  both  Slovenia  and
Macedonia asked for recognition from the European Commission. Although the 1991 EC
Badinter  commission  judged  both  countries  as  democratic,  and  recommended  their
recognition, initially only Slovenia was recognized as an independent country. Moreover,
as a result of the policy of the Macedonian party leadership in favor of preservation of
Yugoslavia, the new Macedonia elites in the period of democratic consolidation, after
Yugoslavia broke down, faced various difficult obstacles including diplomatic pressure
from Greece,  economic  sanctions,  and minority  issues.  As  Higley  and Pakulski  argue
exactly,  this  type  of  problems  effectively  slow  down  the  process  of  democratic
consolidation114. Therefore, despite the gradual transformation and liberalization of the
system, and the early reached elite consensus, Macedonia, unlike Slovenia, experienced
difficult period of democratic consolidation (but this is the topic of another inquiry).
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the paths of transition followed by these two former Yugoslavian republics. He also shows the
importance of the elite's responses to the status of second Yugoslavia in the frame of this process
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